Recent types of train protection systems such as ATC require the large amounts of low-level configuration data compared to conventional types of them. Hence management of the configuration data is becoming more important than before. Because of this, the authors developed an error-proof system focusing on human operations in the configuration data management. This error-proof system has already been introduced to the Tokaido Shinkansen ATC data management system. However, as effectiveness of the system has not been presented objectively, its full perspective is not clear. To clarify the effectiveness, this paper analyses error-proofing cases introduced to the system, using the concept of QFD and the error-proofing principles. From this analysis, the following methods of evaluation for error-proof systems are proposed: metrics to review the rationality of required qualities are provided by arranging the required qualities according to hazard levels and work phases; metrics to evaluate error-proof systems are provided to improve their reliability effectively by mapping the error-proofing principles onto the error-proofing cases which are applied according to the required qualities and the corresponding hazard levels. In addition, these objectively-analysed error-proofing cases are available to be used as error-proofing-cases database or guidelines for safer HMI design especially for data management.
Introduction
Railway signalling systems are available for practical use after the configuration process in which a generic application is customised to realise specific applications corresponding to actual specifications of target railway-line. In this customisation, configuration data is assigned to a generic application program according to track geometry and different local conditions. The potential of introducing errors to the configuration data can lead to the undesirable events that safe separation of trains and safe speed are not ensured. Therefore, it is a safety critical issue to eliminate errors from the configuration data.
To solve this problem, the authors developed a data validation system which covers not only syntax but also semantics, utilising Extensible Markup Language (XML) technologies (1) .
actual configurations of the train protection systems called Automatic Train Control (ATC) of the Tokaido and the Kyushu Shinkansen lines, some difficulties have arisen in the semantic validation due to the fact that semantic data-definitions are not necessarily applicable to all classes of the configuration data. Furthermore, even if all configuration data errors are detected and eliminated by using the data validation system, inadvertent errors of data management may result in losing consistency with infrastructure features such as track geometry. This result might generate incorrect data objects. Because of this, the authors focused on human operations in the configuration data management in order to improve the reliability of the configuration data, then developed an error-proof system capable of preventing inadvertent operations and of addressing the above-mentioned difficulties of semantic validation. This error-proof system has also already been introduced to the Tokaido Shinkansen ATC data management. However, as effectiveness of the system has not been presented objectively, its full perspective is not clear. Thus this paper proposes methods to analyse and evaluate error-proof systems.
Following this introduction, the concept of our configuration data management system is presented in Section 2. Error-proofing cases introduced to the system are analysed by using the quality function deployment (QFD) method (2) and the error-proofing principles (3) in Section 3. From this analysis, some metrics for evaluating error-proof systems are proposed in Section 4.
Configuration Data Management
In order to improve functions of the train protection, the Tokaido Shinkansen has adopted a new type of ATC which dynamically generates train protection profiles on onboard equipment. Considering that these profiles are calculated according to the onboard database in which the large amounts of low-level configuration data are stored, the authors developed a data validation system to detect errors of the data by means of static analysis instead of depending on the conventional dynamic testing. This data validation system has successfully detected errors and contributed to elimination of the errors from the configuration data sufficiently, while those errors are difficult to be detected by the conventional visual checking on printout of data.
After the new ATC was introduced, a large project for the Tokaido Shinkansen is now under way aiming at the raising of the transportation capacity. This project needs to switch the database over 10 times during its progress and within its strict schedule which requires concurrent tasks to prepare the corresponding configuration data object.
To carry out this scheme, it is important to reliably manage the project itself and the configuration data object because inadvertent errors of data management may result in incorrect data objects even if all configuration data errors are detected and eliminated by using the data validation system. This result means that the current configuration data object loses consistency with corresponding track geometry and local conditions when the database is switched.
For that reason, the authors developed a data management system as an error-proof system to ensure the management of the configuration data focusing on human operations. operator staff to enter and manage the large amounts of configuration data for the ATC is the first case. Hence this system development is considered as a valuable case for future reference. However, as effectiveness of the system has not been presented objectively, its full perspective is not clear.
This section intends to clarify the overall picture of the above-mentioned ATC data management system and to extract usable data for the next system development and evaluation. Figure 1 shows a proposed process for the analysis. Subsection 3.2 classifies work items according to the system functions and preliminarily analyses the consequences of success or failure at every step of the items using event tree analysis (ETA). Subsection 3.3 arranges customer requirements being transformed into required items and required qualities. Based on results of the above ETA, §3.4 assigns hazard levels to the required items and classifies the required qualities into work phases. According to the arrangement in §3.3, §3.5 arranges error-proofing cases introduced to the data management system and maps error-proofing principles onto the cases to lead to the review and evaluation in §4. 
Preliminary Analysis following Classification of Work Items
Work items of data management are classified based on functions of the system as follows:
(1) data entry; (2) verification of entered data; (3) verification of difference of entered data; (4) data validation; (5) workflow management; (6) version management; (7) security management. Figure 2 shows an event tree analysis (ETA) that expresses the consequence of success or failure at every step of those items and the data provision which is done beforehand. This ETA represents that, for example, the work items (2) and (3) are conducted in order to protect against failures of the data provision and the item (1); the item (4) is the last line of defence in case of failures through the item (3). In addition, the item (4) syntax validation is not effective to protect against failures of the data provision which lead to semantic data errors. At the same time, each failure of the items (5) -(7) can lead to data object errors.
This figure of ETA also represents clearly different targets between the validation and the management. While the former intends to eliminate data errors by success of the data validation denoted by the symbol " ‡", the latter intends to protect data and data object against errors by means of reducing failures in each work item denoted by the symbol " †".
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Transforming User Demands into Required Items and Required Qualities
According to quality function deployment (QFD), a method to transform user demands into design quality, this paper transforms the above-mentioned work items into required items and required qualities. The required qualities are succinct representation in terms of quality for system development. The required items are provided to induce idea just before the transformation into the required qualities and to facilitate such transforming process.
By this means, user demands for the ATC data management system development are transformed as shown in the columns "Required Items" and "Required Qualities" of Table  1 . It should be noted that another work item "(8) System Management" to manage the system is added to this Table 1 . 
Assigning Hazard Levels and Classifying into Work Phases
To clarify differences of critical levels among required items, this paper assigns hazard levels to the required items. In this analysis, the hazard levels (HLs) are defined as follows:
• I: negligible effect;
• II: inefficient work to loss of production time;
• III: confusion to make it impossible to continue work;
• IV: data errors remaining or data object errors to lead to undesirable ATC system failures.
These hazard levels are assigned as shown in the column "HL" of Table 1 . This assignment depends on the ETA shown as Fig. 2 . While failures of the work items (1) - (3) can be protected by the subsequent work, failures of the work items (4) -(7) might lead directly to data errors remaining or data object errors. Therefore, the HL-II is assigned to the former items and up to the HL-IV can be assigned to the latter ones. However, it should be taken into account that, considering the above-mentioned semantic validation which is difficult to be applied to all classes of data, the error-proofing in the work items (1) - (3) is intended to have another role to complement the semantic validation of the work item (4). Therefore, data errors corresponding to the HL-IV are regarded as mandatory targets of the semantic validation.
The required qualities are classified into the following three work phases (WPs) in accordance with human machine interface (HMI) work:
• handling (H): reach the target of operation;
• understanding (U): understand displayed contents to think and decide what to do; • action (A): move into action such as data entry.
As a result of applying this approach to the above-mentioned required qualities, the proposed classification is shown in the column "WP" of Table 1 .
Mapping Error-Proofing Principles onto Error-Proofing Cases
As shown in Table 2 , 138 items of error-proofing cases introduced to the ATC data management system are arranged according to the required items and the required qualities. Although these cases have the same purpose in terms of error-proofing, their methods and effects are not the same. Besides, while descriptions of the extracted cases are recommended to be expressed in a certain level of abstract representation, too much abstraction will not be applicable to be used in practical design. With these circumstances, while keeping the descriptions concrete, effects of the cases should be expressed by some other kind of representation. Thus this paper proposes the use of the error-proofing principles (EPs) as a means of the representation. The principles mapped onto the arranged cases are classified into the following six measures for "preventing causes" proposed by Suzuki (3) :
• eliminate (EP-1): eliminate contributing factor;
• automate/alternate (EP-2a/2b): replace operations with simple and assured ones;
• guide and assist (EP-3): provide direction for decision, memory and operations;
• attract attention (EP-4): raise operators' awareness continually or temporarily;
• complicate (EP-5): increase steps of operations, e.g. by forcing a special procedure;
• detect abnormality (EP-6): provide alarm or halt the system by detecting abnormality just before occurrence of failures.
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Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010 (98) Provide comment areas to inform of the project's content precisely 2b (99) Provide warnings to make sure the operator is aware of necessity for appropriate actions after derivation of project 2b (100) Show the above warnings (named as "warning to reflect") in yellow colour 2b (101) Provide facilities to designate necessary actions on the icon of derived event referring to the original project 2b (102) Provide warnings to make sure the operator is aware of necessity for appropriate actions after derivation of project 3 (103) Generate and manage one database for each project 3 (104) Formulate a database revision control concept to be adapted to the actual system operations 3 (105) Provide warnings to make sure the operator is aware of necessity for appropriate actions after derivation of project 5 (106) Provide the way to generate a project only by derivation, to eliminate the independent project 5 IV -Ensure data object management A -Ensure the management from data entry to changing database (107) Do not permit the project derived from old project whose database is used but not in current use 1 (108) Make the workflow design operation exclusive: data entry disabled on this operation 1 (109) Protect the event from being deleted during or after its execution 1 (110) Restrict deleting the project from which another project is derived 
Review and Evaluation of Error-Proof Systems
Review of Required Qualities
As proposed in §3.4, by assigning hazard levels to the required items and by classifying the required qualities into work phases, we can review the required qualities in perspective of the hazard levels and the work phases. Table 3 shows the total number of required qualities for each work phase of each hazard level. From this result, the rationality of the required qualities can be reviewed as follows:
• Work phases corresponding to the required qualities deployed to HL-IV are limited to WP-H and WP-A while many of the required qualities correspond to WP-A. This is considered as a proper review because it is more critical in HL-IV to provide error-proofing at WP-A which is the last phase of work. Besides, error-proofing at WP-U is not meaningful in this hazard level.
• Work phases corresponding to the required qualities deployed to HL-III are limited to WP-H and WP-U. This is considered as a proper review because some measures must be provided prior to the work phase "action", as the definition of HL-III is confusion of work.
• Work phases corresponding to the required qualities deployed to HL-II are not limited to any of WP-H, WP-U and WP-A. This is also considered as proper because error-proofing at all work-phases are needed in this hazard level. In this way, by arranging the required qualities according to the hazard levels and the work phases, metrics to review the rationality of the required qualities are provided. However, this clear review relies on the ETA from which HL-II is assigned to the work item (1) data entry. In case that the semantic validation of the work item (4) does not cover all of the critical data whose errors lead to undesirable ATC system failures, HL-IV must be assigned to the work item (2) verification of entered data, (3) verification of difference of entered data, or WP-A/H of (1) data entry. This means that required qualities and error-proofing for the particular data which is not covered by the validation need to be sufficiently specified.
Evaluation of Error-Proofing Cases
As proposed in §3.5, by mapping the error-proofing principles onto the error-proofing cases which are applied according to the required qualities and the corresponding hazard levels, we can see the cases in perspective of the hazard levels and the work phases. Table 4 shows the total number of the error-proofing principles for each work phase of each hazard level. From this result, characteristics of the cases can be found as follows:
• Error-proofing principles corresponding to the error-proofing cases introduced to HL-IV are limited to EP-1 and EP-2a, but EP-6 is also available in the case of
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WP-H.
• Error-proofing principles corresponding to the error-proofing cases introduced to HL-III are limited to EP-1, EP-2a/2b and EP-6 in the case of WP-H where severity is similar to HL-IV.
• Error-proofing principles corresponding to the error-proofing cases introduced to HL-II are according to work phases as follows, because requirements are not necessarily critical in this level: -for WP-H, more EP-1 is introduced; -for WP-U, EP-3 is mainly introduced; -for WP-A, EP-2a/2b, EP-3 and EP-5 are introduced in that order. According to the above-mentioned proposals, specific error-proofing cases can be grouped into the facets of hazard levels, work phases and error-proofing principles while the cases are expressed concretely. This grouping no longer makes those cases just random examples and enables us to refer them as guidelines or a knowledge database of error-proofing cases for safer HMI design especially for data management. That is, designers will be able to design error-proof systems more effectively even if they do not have wide experience.
Conclusions
Recent types of train protection systems such as ATC require the large amounts of low-level configuration data compared to the conventional types. Hence the configuration data management is becoming more important than before. Because of this, the authors developed an error-proof system focusing on human operations in the configuration data management. To clarify effectiveness of error-proof systems, this paper analysed error-proofing cases of the Tokaido Shinkansen ATC data management system and proposed methods of evaluation for the error-proof systems.
The proposed process of analysis:
• classifies work items according to the system functions and preliminarily analyses the consequences of success or failure at every step of the items using ETA, • arranges customer requirements being transformed into required items and required qualities based on the concept of QFD, • assigns hazard levels to the required items and classifies the required qualities into work phases, • arranges error-proofing cases introduced to the data management system according to the required items and the required qualities, • and maps error-proofing principles onto the cases.
Consequently, the following results are derived:
• metrics to review the rationality of the required qualities are provided by arranging the required qualities according to hazard levels and work phases;
• metrics to evaluate error-proof systems are provided to improve their reliability effectively by mapping the error-proofing principles onto the error-proofing cases which are applied according to the required qualities and the corresponding hazard levels;
• the arranged and mapped error-proofing cases are available to be used as error-proofing-cases database or guidelines for safer HMI design especially for data management.
